In
philosophy the theory of
materialism holds that the only thing that
exists is
matter; that all things are composed of
material and all phenomena (including
consciousness) are the result of material interactions. In other words, matter is the only
substance. As a theory, materialism is a form of
physicalism and belongs to the class of
monist ontology. As such, it is different from ontological theories based on
dualism or
pluralism. For singular explanations of the phenomenal reality, materialism would be in contrast to
idealism and to
spiritualism.
Overview
The view is perhaps best understood in its opposition to the doctrines of immaterial substance applied to the mind historically, famously by
René Descartes. However, by itself materialism says nothing about how material substance should be characterized. In practice it is frequently assimilated to one variety of
physicalism or another.
Materialism is often associated with
reductionism, according to which the objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they are genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at some other level of description — typically, a more general level than the reduced one.
Non-reductive materialism explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the terms canonically used for the basic material constituents.
Jerry Fodor influentially argues this view, according to which empirical laws and explanations in "special sciences" like psychology or geology are invisible from the perspective of basic physics. A lot of vigorous literature has grown up around the relation between these views.
Modern philosophical materialists extend the definition of other scientifically observable entities such as
energy,
forces, and the
curvature of space. However philosophers such as
Mary Midgley suggest that the concept of "matter" is elusive and poorly defined.
Materialism typically contrasts with
dualism,
phenomenalism,
idealism,
vitalism and
dual-aspect monism. Its materiality can, in some ways, be linked to the concept of
Determinism, as espoused by
Enlightenment thinkers.
Materialism has been criticised by religious thinkers opposed to it, who regard it as a
spiritually empty philosophy.
Marxism uses
materialism to refer to a "materialist conception of history", which is not concerned with
metaphysics but centers on the roughly empirical world of human activity (practice, including labor) and the
institutions created, reproduced, or destroyed by that activity (see
materialist conception of history).
History of materialism
Axial Age
Materialism developed, possibly independently, in several geographically separated regions of
Eurasia during the
Axial Age.
In
Ancient Indian
philosophy, materialism developed around 600 BCE with the works of
Ajita Kesakambali,
Payasi,
Kanada, and the proponents of the
Cārvāka school of philosophy. Kanada was one of the early proponents of
atomism. The
Nyaya-
Vaisesika school (600 BCE - 100 BCE) developed one of the earliest forms of atomism, though their proofs of God and positing that the consciousness was not material made them not to be materialists. The atomic tradition was carried forward by
Buddhist atomism and the
Jaina school.
Xun Zi developed a
Confucian doctrine oriented on realism and materialism in Ancient China. Other notable Chinese materialists of this time include
Yang Xiong and
Wang Chong.
Ancient
Greek philosophers like
Thales,
Parmenides,
Anaxagoras,
Epicurus and
Democritus prefigure later materialists. The poem
De Rerum Natura by
Lucretius recounts the
mechanistic philosophy of
Democritus and
Epicurus. According to this view, all that exists is matter and void, and all phenomena are the result of different motions and conglomerations of base material particles called "atoms."
De Rerum Natura provides mechanistic explanations for phenomena such as erosion, evaporation, wind, and sound. Famous principles like "nothing can come from nothing" and "nothing can touch body but body" first appeared in the works of Lucretius.
Common Era
Later Indian materialist
Jayaraashi Bhatta (6th century CE) in his work
Tattvopaplavasimha ("the Upsetting of all principles") refuted the
Nyaya Sutra epistemology. The materialistic Cārvāka philosophy appears to have died out some time after 1400 CE.
In early 12th-century
al-Andalus, the
Arabian philosopher,
Ibn Tufail (Abubacer), wrote discussions on materialism in his
philosophical novel,
Hayy ibn Yaqdhan (
Philosophus Autodidactus), while vaguely foreshadowing the idea of a
historical materialism.
[Dominique Urvoy, "The Rationality of Everyday Life: The Andalusian Tradition? (Aropos of Hayy's First Experiences)", in Lawrence I. Conrad (1996), The World of Ibn Tufayl: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, pp. 38-46, Brill Publishers, ISBN 9004093001.]European Enlightenment
Later on,
Thomas Hobbes and
Pierre Gassendi represent the materialist tradition, in opposition to
René Descartes' attempts to provide the
natural sciences with
dualist foundations. They were followed by
athiestic materalists
Jean Meslier,
Julien Offroy de La Mettrie, Paul-Henri Thiry
Baron d'Holbach,
Denis Diderot and other minor French
enlightenment thinkers, as well as
Ludwig Feuerbach, and, in England, the pedestrian traveller
John "Walking" Stewart, whose insistence that all matter is endowed with a
moral dimension had a major impact on the philosophical poetry of
William Wordsworth.
Schopenhauer wrote that "...materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets to take account of himself." He claimed that an observing subject can only know material objects through the mediation of the brain and its particular organization. The way that the brain knows determines the way that material objects are experienced. "Everything objective, extended, active, and hence everything material, is regarded by materialism as so solid a basis for its explanations that a reduction to this (especially if it should ultimately result in thrust and counter-thrust) can leave nothing to be desired. But all this is something that is given only very indirectly and conditionally, and is therefore only relatively present, for it has passed through the machinery and fabrication of the brain, and hence has entered the forms of time, space, and causality, by virtue of which it is first of all presented as extended in space and operating in time."
Marx's social materialism
Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels, turning the
idealist dialectics of
Georg Hegel upside down, came up with
dialectical materialism and a materialist account of the course of history known as
historical materialism. For Marx, the base material of the world is social relations (and mainly class relations, e.g, between serfs and lord, or today, between employees and employer). As an expression of these basic social relations, all other
ideologies form, including those of science, economics, law, morality, etc.
Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels used the term to refer to a theoretical perspective that holds the satisfaction of everyday economic needs is the primary reality in every epoch of history. Opposed to German idealist philosophy, materialism takes the position that society and reality originate from a set of simple economic acts which human beings carry out in order to provide the material necessities of food, shelter, and clothing. Materialism takes as its starting point that before anything else, human beings must produce their everyday economic needs through their physical labor and practical productive activity. This single economic act, Marx believed, gives rise to a system of social relations which include political, legal and religious structures of society.
Scientific materialists
Many current and recent philosophers in the school of
scientific materialism —e.g.,
Daniel Dennett,
Willard Van Orman Quine,
Donald Davidson,
John Rogers Searle,
Jerry Fodor, and
Richard Dawkins—operate within a broadly physicalist or materialist framework, producing rival accounts of how best to accommodate
mind—
functionalism,
anomalous monism,
identity theory and so on.
In recent years,
Paul and
Patricia Churchland have advocated a more extreme position,
eliminativist materialism, which holds that mental phenomena simply do not exist at all—that talk of the mental reflects a totally spurious "
folk psychology" that simply has no basis in fact, something like the way that folk science speaks of demon-caused illness.
Defining matter
The nature and definition of matter have been subject to much debate, as have other key concepts in science and philosophy. Is there a single kind of matter which everything is made of (
hyle), or multiple kinds? Is matter a continuous substance capable of expressing multiple forms (
hylomorphism), or a number of discrete, unchanging constituents (
atomism)?
Does it have intrinsic properties (
substance theory), or is it lacking them (
prima materia)?
Without question science has made unexpected discoveries about matter. Some paraphrase departures from traditional or
common-sense concepts of matter as "disproving the existence of matter".
However, most physical scientists take the view that the concept of matter has merely changed, rather than being eliminated.
One challenge to the traditional concept of matter as tangible "stuff" is the rise of field physics in the 19th century. However the conclusion that materialism is false may be premature.
Relativity shows that matter and energy (including the spatially distributed energy of fields) are interchangeable. This enables the ontological view that energy is
prima materia and matter is one of its forms. On the other hand,
quantum field theory models fields as
exchanges of particles —
photons for
electromagnetic fields and so on. On this view it could be said that fields are "really matter".
All known solid, liquid, and gaseous substances are composed of protons, neutrons and electrons. All three are
fermions or spin-half particles, whereas the particles that mediate fields in
quantum field theory are
bosons. Thus matter can be said to divide into a more tangible fermionic kind and a less tangible bosonic kind. However it is now generally believed that less than 5% of the physical composition of the universe is made up of such "matter", and the majority of the universe is composed of
Dark Matter and
Dark Energy - with no agreement amongst scientists about what these are made of. This obviously refutes the traditional materialism that held that the only things that exist are things composed of the kind of matter with which we are broadly familiar ("traditional matter") - which was anyway under great strain as noted above from
Relativity and
quantum field theory. But if the definition of "matter" is extended to "anything whose existence can be inferred from the observed behaviour of traditional matter" then there is no reason
in principle why entities whose existence materialists normally deny should not be considered as "matter"
Some philosophers feel that these dichotomies necessitate a switch from materialism to physicalism. Others use materialism and physicalism interchangeably.
Criticism and alternatives
The professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame
Alvin Plantinga criticises it, and the Emiritus Regius Professor of Divinity
Keith Ward suggests that materialism is rare amongst contemporary UK philosophers: "Looking around my philosopher colleagues in Britain, virtually all of whom I know at least from their published work, I would say that very few of them are materialists.".
Religious and spiritual objections
According to the Catholic Encyclopedia, materialism denies the existence of both God and the soul. It is therefore incompatible with most world religions including
Islam,
Christianity,
Judaism, and
Buddhism.
In most of
Hinduism and
Transcendentalism, all matter is believed to be an illusion called
Maya, blinding us from knowing the truth. Maya is the limited, purely physical and mental reality in which our everyday consciousness has become entangled. Maya gets destroyed for a person when they perceive
Brahman with transcendental knowledge.
Kant argued against all three forms of materialism, subjective idealism (which he contrasts with his "transcendental idealism") and dualism. However, Kant also argues that change and
time require an enduring substrate., and does so in connection with his Refutation of Idealism
Postmodern/
poststructuralist thinkers also express a skepticism about any all-encompassing metaphysical scheme.
Philosopher
Mary Midgley, among others , argues that materialism is a
self-refuting idea, at least in its eliminative form.
Other ontologies
Bundle Theory. It can be argued that it is the properties of material bodies, such as size and shape, which are perceived, and not the material substrate itself.
Locke said we "know not what" the basic substance is. As
Berkeley wrote "I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as we do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce any idea in our minds". If mind-independent properties (properly speaking property-instances or
tropes) are held to exist
in association with each other but without a material substrate,
bundle theory results. If bundle theory is shown to be illogical or inconceivable, the existence of a substrate is thereby demonstrated conceptually, despite the unpercievability of matter per se.
Idealism. An argument for
idealism, such as those of
Hegel and
Berkeley is
ipso facto an argument against materialism. Matter can be argued to be redundant, as in bundle theory, and mind-independent properties can in turn be reduced to subjective
percepts.
Dualism. If matter is seen as necessary to explain the physical world, but incapable of explaining mind,
dualism results.
Emergence,
Holism and
Process philosophy are some of the approaches that seek to ameliorate the perceived shortcomings of traditional (especially
mechanistic) materialism without abandoning materialism entirely.
Materialism as methodology
Some critics object to materialism as part of an overly skeptical, narrow or
reductivist approach to theorizing, rather than to the ontological claim that matter is the only substance.
Particle physicist and
theologian John Polkinghorne objects to what he calls
promissory materialism — claims that materialistic science
will eventually be able to explain phenomena it has not so far been able to explain. He prefers
dual-aspect monism to materialism.
The psychologist
Imants Barušs suggests that "materialists tend to indiscriminately apply a 'pebbles in a box' schema to explanations of reality even though such a schema is known to be incorrect in general for physical phenomena. Thus, materialism cannot explain matter, let alone anomalous phenomena or subjective experience , but remains entrenched in academia largely for political reasons." (Compare with
Charles Fort)
The flow of time
Four-dimensionalism is the most commonly accepted theory of time among members of the scientific community. Critics of materialism could argue that it's impossible for our subjective
sense of time to arise from a static, four-dimensional universe. It must be noted that the flow of time isn't the same as the
arrow of time.
See also