The 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland was a Soviet Union military operation that started without a formal declaration of war on 17 September 1939, during the early stages of World War II. Sixteen days after Nazi Germany invaded Poland from the west, the Soviet Union did so from the east. The invasion ended on ended 6 October 1939 with Germany and the Soviet Union dividing and annexing the whole of the Second Polish Republic.Gross pp. 17–18
In early 1939, the Soviet Union entered into negotiations with the United Kingdom, France, Poland, and Romania for the purpose of establishing an alliance against Nazi Germany. The negotiations failed when the Soviet Union insisted that Poland and Romania permit Soviet troops transit rights through their territory as part of a collective security agreement.Watson p. 713 The failure of those negotiations led the Soviet Union to conclude the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, a non-aggression pact that contained a secret protocol dividing Northern and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence, with Nazi Germany on 23 August 1939.Watson p. 695–722 One week after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, German forces invaded Poland from the north, south, and west. Polish forces then withdrew to the southeast where they prepared for a long defence of the Romanian Bridgehead and awaited expected French and British support and relief. The Soviet Red Army invaded the Kresy, in accordance with the secret protocol, on 17 September.Kitchen p. 74 The Soviet government announced that it was acting to protect the Ukrainians and Belarusians who lived in the eastern part of Poland, because the Polish state had collapsed in the face of the Nazi German attack and could no longer guarantee the security of its own citizens.Degras pp. 37–45 Facing a second front, the Polish government concluded the defence of the Romanian Bridgehead was no longer feasible and ordered an emergency evacuation of all troops to neutral Romania.
The Red Army achieved its targets, vastly outnumbering Polish resistance and capturing some 230,000 Polish prisoners of war. The Soviet government annexed the territory under its control and in November 1939 made the 13.5 million formerly Polish citizens, under its control, citizens of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union immediately started a campaign of sovietization of the newly acquired areas. This included staged elections, the results of which the Soviet Union used to legitimize its annexation of eastern Poland. The Soviets quelled opposition through executions and thousands of arrests.Rummel p. 130Rieber p. 30 The Soviet Union sent hundreds of thousands to Siberia and other remote parts of the Soviet Union in four major waves of deportation between 1939 and 1941.

The Soviet forces occupied eastern Poland until the Summer of 1941 when they were expelled by the invading German army in the course of Operation Barbarossa. The area was under Nazi occupation until the Red Army reconquered it in the summer of 1944. An agreement at the Yalta Conference permitted the Soviet Union to annex almost all of their Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact portion of the Second Polish Republic, compensating the People's Republic of Poland with the southern half of East Prussia and territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line. The Soviet Union folded the invaded territories into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.Wettig p. 47

Background

Historical background

In the aftermath of World War I, the borders of Eastern Europe changed dramatically.Fraser, Dunn, von Habsburg p. 2 Nations of the region saw a chance to establish independent nation states and seized the opportunity. Soviet Russia viewed these territories as rebellious Russian provinces, vital to Russian security, but was unable to react swiftly to counter the independence movements.Goldstein p. 51 The success of the Greater Poland Uprising resulted in the establishment of a sovereign Polish state, the Second Polish Republic.Davies (2002) pp. 279–290 The Paris Peace Conference did not make a definitive ruling concerning the frontiers between Poland and Soviet Russia, nor was the issue addressed in the Treaty of Versailles.Kutrzeba p. 512 The peace conference did issue a provisional boundary in December 1919, the Curzon line, as an attempt to define the territories that had a Polish ethnic majority, but the participants did not feel competent to make a certain judgment on the competing claims.House & Seymour p. 84
The result of the Paris Peace Conference did little of decrease the territorial ambitions of parties in the region. Józef Piłsudski sought to expand the Polish borders as far east as feasible in an attempt to create a Polish-led federation to counterweigh any potential imperialist intentions on the part of Russia or Germany.Roshwald p. 37 At the same time, the Bolsheviks began to gain the upper hand in the Russian Civil War and started to advance westward towards the disputed territories with the intent of assisting other Communist movements in Western Europe.Davies (1972) p. 29 The border skirmishes of 1919 progressively escalated into the Polish–Soviet War in 1920.Davies (2002) p. 22, 504 Following the Polish victory at the Battle of Warsaw, the Soviets sued for peace and the war ended with an armistice in October 1920.Kutrzeba pp. 524, 528 The parties signed the formal peace treaty, the Peace of Riga, on 18 March 1921, dividing the disputed territories between Poland and Soviet Russia.Davies (2002) p. 376 In an action that largely determined the Soviet-Polish border during the interwar period, the Soviets offered the Polish peace delegation territorial concessions in the contested borderland areas, closely resembling the border between the Russian Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth before the first partition of 1772.Davies (2002) p. 504 In the aftermath of the peace agreement, Soviet leaders largely abandoned the cause of international revolution and did not return to the concept for approximately 20 years.Davies (1972) p. xi

Treaty negotiations

alt=Map showing the planned and actual divisions of Poland according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

In mid-March 1939, the Soviet Union, Britain and France began trading suggestions and plans regarding a potential political and military agreement to counter potential German aggression.Watson p. 698Gronowicz p. 51 Poland did not participate in these talks, acting on the belief that any Polish alignment with Soviet Russia would lead to a serious German reaction.Neilson p. 275 The tripartite discussions focused on potential guarantees to central and eastern European countries should a German aggression arise.Carley 303–341 The Soviets did not trust the British of the French to honor a collective security agreement, since they had failed to move against the Fascists during the Spanish Civil War or protect Czechoslovakia from the expansionist goals of Nazi Germany. The Soviet Union also suspected that Britain and France would seek to remain at the sidelines of any potential Nazi-Soviet conflict.Kenéz pp. 129-131 As a result, the Soviets sought nothing short of an ironclad military alliance that would provide guaranteed support against an attack on its territory.Watson p. 695 The Soviet Union insisted on a sphere of influence stretching from Finland to Romania, to serve as a buffer zone, and military support in the event another country attacked the Soviet Union or a country within its proposed sphere of influence.Shaw p. 119Neilson p. 298 The Soviet Union also insisted on the right to enter those countries in its sphere of influence in the event its security was threatened.Watson p. 708 When the military talks began in mid-August, negotiations quickly stalled over the topic of Soviet troop passage through Poland if Germans attacked, and the parties waited as British and French officials pressured Polish officials to agree to such terms.Watson p. 713Shirer p. 536 However, Polish officials refused to allow Soviet troops on to Polish territory because they believed that once the Red Army entered their territory it might never leave.Shirer p. 537 The Soviets suggested that Poland's wishes be ignored and that the tripartite agreements be concluded despite its objections.Neilson p. 315 The British refused to do so because they believed that such a move would push Poland to establish stronger bilateral relations with Germany.Neilson p. 311
Meanwhile, Germany official secretly hinted to Soviet diplomats for months that it could offer better terms for a political agreement than Britain and France.Roberts p. 30 The Soviet Union began discussion with Nazi Germany regarding the establishment on an economic agreement while concurrently negotiating with those of the tripartite group. In late July and early August 1939, Soviet and German officials agreed on most of the details for a planned economic agreement, and specifically addressed a potential political agreement.Shirer p. 503 On 19 August 1939, German and Soviet officials concluded the 1939 German–Soviet Commercial Agreement, an economic agreement that exchanged Soviet Union raw materials to Germany in exchange for weapons, military technology and civilian machinery. Two days later, the Soviets suspended the tripartite military talks.Shirer p. 525 On 24 August, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the political and military deal that accompanied the trade agreement, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. The pact was an agreement of mutual non-aggression that contained secret protocols dividing the states of Northern and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence. The Soviet sphere of influence initially included Latvia, Estonia and Finland. Germany and the Soviet Union would partition Poland, the areas east of the Pisa, Narev, Vistula, and San rivers going to the Soviet Union. The pact provided the Soviets with extra defensive space in the west, presented an opportunity to regain territories ceded in the Peace of Riga and unite the eastern and western Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples under a Soviet government.Dunnigan p. 132Snyder p. 77
The day after the Germans and Soviets signed the pact, the French and British military negotiation delegation urgently requested a meeting with Soviet military negotiator Kliment Voroshilov.Shirer p. 541–2 On August 25, Voroshilov told them "[i]n view of the changed political situation, no useful purpose can be served in continuing the conversation." The same day, Britain and Poland signed the British-Polish Pact of Mutual Assistance.Osmańczyk-Mango p. 231 In this accord, Britain committed itself to the defense of Poland, guaranteeing to preserve Polish independence.

German Invasion of Poland

On 26 August, Hitler tried to dissuade the British and the French from interfering in the upcoming conflict, even pledging to make Wehrmacht forces available to Britain in the future. At midnight on 29 August, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop handed British Ambassador Neville Henderson the list of terms that would allegedly ensure peace in regards to Poland. Under the terms, Poland would return Danzig to Germany and there was to be a plebiscite in the Polish Corridor, based on residency in 1919, within the year.Davies (2002) p. 371–373 When Polish Ambassador Lipski went to see Ribbentrop on 30 August, he announced that he did not have the full power to sign, and Ribbentrop dismissed him.Mowat p. 648 The Germans announced that Poland had rejected Germany's offer, and negotiations with Poland ended.Henderson p. 16-18 On 31 August, German units posing as Polish troops staged the Gleiwitz incident near the border city of Gleiwitz.Manvell-Fraenkel p. 76 The following morning Hitler ordered hostilities against Poland to start at 4:45 1 September 1939.
The Allied governments declared war on Germany on 3 September but failed to provide any meaningful support.Mowat p. 648–650 Despite some Polish successes in minor border battles, German technical, operational and numerical superiority forced the Polish armies to retreat from the borders towards Warsaw and Lwów. On 10 September, the Polish commander-in-chief, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, ordered a general retreat to the southeast towards the Romanian Bridgehead.Stanley p. 29 Soon after beginning their invasion of Poland, the Nazi leaders began urging the Soviets to play their agreed part and attack Poland from the east. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and German ambassador to Moscow Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg exchanged a series of diplomatic messages on the matter but the Soviets nevertheless delayed their invasion of eastern Poland. The Soviets were distracted by crucial events relating to their ongoing border disputes with Japan, needed time to mobilize the Red Army and they saw a diplomatic advantage in waiting until Poland had disintegrated before making their move.Weinberg p. 55 On 17 September 1939, Molotov declared on the radio that all treaties between the Soviet Union and Poland were now void because the Polish government had abandoned its people and effectively ceased to exist.Piotrowski p. 295 On the same day, the Red Army crossed the border into Poland.Zaloga p. 80

Opposing forces

Military campaign

alt=A map showing the disposition of all troops following the Soviet invasion

The Red Army entered the eastern regions of Poland with seven field armies, containing between 450,000 and 1,000,000 troops, split between two fronts. Comandarm 2nd rank Mikhail Kovalyov lead the Red Army the invasion on the Belarusian Front while Comandarm 1st rank Semyon Timoshenko commanded the invasion on the Ukrainian Front.
Under the Polish defensive plan for the western border, Plan West, Poland assumed the Soviet Union would remain neutral. As a result, Polish commanders sent most of their troops to face the Germans invasion in the west. By this time only 20 under-strength battalions, consisted of about 20,000 troops of the Border Protection Corps, defended the eastern border.Sanford pp. 20–24 When the Red Army invaded, the Polish military was in the midst of a fighting retreat, with the intent of regrouping along the Romanian Bridgehead to await British and French relief.

Rydz-Śmigły, was initially inclined to order the eastern border forces to resist, but was dissuaded by Prime Minister Felicjan Sławoj Składkowski and President Ignacy Mościcki. At 4:00 pm on September 17 he issued an order commanding the troops to fall back and engage the Soviets only in self-defense. Communications systems had been severely damaged, breaking the chain of command.Gross p. 17 In the resulting confusion, clashes occurred along the border. General Wilhelm Orlik-Rückemann, given the command of KOP on August 30, had received no official directives since then, and he and his subordinates continued their armed resistance before dissolving the group on October 1.
The response of non-ethnic Poles to the situation added a further complication. Many Ukrainians, Belarusians and Jews welcomed the invading troops as liberators.Gross pp. 32–33 The local reaction was mentioned by Lev Mekhlis, who told Stalin that people of West Ukraine welcomed the Soviets "like true liberators".Montefiore p 312 The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists rebelled against the Poles, and communist partisans organized local uprisings, such as that in Skidel. The Jewish population had suffered through pogroms in eastern Poland during the German invasion, and many saw the Soviets as the lesser of two evils.Mendelsohn p. 218Levin p. 31-32 This reaction would strengthen the existing Polish fears of Żydokomuna and trouble Polish-Jewish relations into the 21st century.Polonsky & Michlic p. 36

alt=A photo of a German and a Soviet officer shaking hands at the end of the invasion of Poland

The Polish political and military leaders knew that they were losing the war against Germany even before the Soviet invasion settled the issue. Nevertheless, they refused to surrender or negotiate a peace with Germany. Instead, the Polish government ordered all military units to evacuate Poland and reassemble in France. The government itself crossed into Romania at around midnight on 17 September 1939. Polish units proceeded to manoeuvre towards the Romanian bridgehead area, sustaining German attacks on one flank and occasionally clashing with Soviet troops on the other. In the days following the evacuation order, the Germans defeated the Polish Armies Kraków and Lublin at the Battle of Tomaszów Lubelski, which lasted from 17 September to 20 September.Taylor p. 38.
Soviet units often met their German counterparts advancing from the opposite direction. Notable examples of co-operation occurred between the two armies in the field. The Wehrmacht passed the Brest Fortress, which had been seized after the Battle of Brześć Litewski, to the Soviet 29th Tank Brigade on 17 September. German General Heinz Guderian and Soviet Brigadier Semyon Krivoshein then held a joint victory parade in the town. Lwów (Lviv) surrendered on 22 September, days after the Germans handed the siege operations over to the Soviets. Soviet forces had taken Wilno on 19 September after a two-day battle, and they took Grodno on 24 September after a four-day battle. By 28 September, the Red Army had reached the line formed by the Narew, Western Bug, Vistula and San rivers—the border agreed in advance with the Germans.

Despite a tactical Polish victory on 28 September at the Battle of Szack, the outcome of the larger conflict was never in doubt. Civilian volunteers, militias, and reorganised retreating units held out against German forces in the in the Polish capital, Warsaw, until 28 September, and the Modlin Fortress, north of Warsaw, surrendered the next day after an intense sixteen-day battle. On 1 October, Soviet troops drove Polish units into the forests at the battle of Wytyczno, one of the last direct confrontations of the campaign.
Several isolated Polish garrisons managed to hold their positions long after being surrounded, such as those in the Volhynian Sarny Fortified Area which held out until September 25. The last operational unit of the Polish Army to surrender was General Franciszek Kleeberg's Independent Operational Group Polesie (Samodzielna Grupa Operacyjna "Polesie"). Kleeberg surrendered on 6 October after the four-day Battle of Kock (near Lublin), which ended the September Campaign. The Soviets were victorious. On 31 October, Molotov reported to the Supreme Soviet: "A short blow by the German army, and subsequently by the Red Army, was enough for nothing to be left of this ugly creature of the Treaty of Versailles".Moynihan p. 93Tucker p. 612

Allied reaction

alt=Political cartoon showing Hitler greeting Stalin. Both men are facing each other and tipping their hats to one another

The reaction of France and Britain to the Soviet invasion and annexation of Eastern Poland was muted, since neither country wanted to start a confrontation with the Soviet Union at that time. Both countries were strongly interested in maintaining relationships with Turkey, which voiced some approval of the invasion's creation of a buffer zone between itself and Germany.Hiden & Lane p.148 Under the terms of the Polish-British Common Defence Pact of 25 August 1939, the British had promised assistance if a European power attacked Poland. A secret protocol of the pact, however, specified that the European power referred to Germany.Hiden & Lane pp.143-144 When Polish Ambassador Edward Raczyński reminded Foreign Secretary Edward Frederick Lindley Wood of the pact, he was bluntly told that it was Britain's business whether to declare war on the Soviet Union. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain considered making a public commitment to restore the Polish state but in the end issued only general condemnations.Prazmowska pp. 44–45. This stance represented Britain's attempt at balance: its security interests included trade with the Soviets that would support its war effort and the possibility of a future Anglo-Soviet alliance against Germany. Public opinion in Britain was divided between expressions of outrage at the invasion and a perception that Soviet claims to the region were reasonable.
The French had made promises to Poland, including the provision of air support, and these were not honoured. A Franco-Polish Military Alliance was signed in 1921 and amended thereafter. The agreements were not strongly supported by the French military leadership, though, and the relationship deteriorated during the 1920s and 1930s.Hehn pp. 69–70 In the French view, the German-Soviet alliance was fragile and overt denunciation of, or action against, the Soviets would not serve either France's or Poland's best interests. Once the Soviets moved into Poland, the French and the British decided there was nothing they could do for Poland in the short term and began planning for a long-term victory instead. The French had advanced tentatively into the Saar in early September, but after the Polish defeat they retreated behind the Maginot Line on 4 October.Jackson p. 75

Aftermath

alt=A photo of a crowd of marching Polish prisoners of war captured by the Red Army during the Soviet invasion of Poland

In October 1939, Molotov reported to the Supreme Soviet that the Soviets had suffered 737 deaths and 1,862 casualties during the campaign, though Polish specialists claim up to 3,000 deaths and 8,000 to 10,000 wounded. On the Polish side, between 6,000 and 7,000 soldiers died fighting the Red Army, with 230,000 to 450,000 taken prisoner. The Soviets often failed to honour terms of surrender. In some cases, they promised Polish soldiers freedom and then arrested them when they laid down their arms.
The Soviet Union had ceased to recognise the Polish state at the start of the invasion. Neither side issued a formal declaration of war; this decision had significant consequences, and Smigly-Rydz would be criticised for it.Sanford pp. 22–23, 39 The Soviets killed tens of thousands of Polish prisoners of war, some during the campaign itself.Sanford p. 23 On 24 September, the Soviets killed 42 staff and patients of a Polish military hospital in the village of Grabowiec, near Zamość. The Soviets also executed all the Polish officers they captured after the Battle of Szack, on 28 September 1939. Over 20,000 Polish military personnel and civilians perished in the Katyn massacre. Torture was used by the NKVD on a wide scale in various prisons, especially those in small towns.Gross p. 182

alt=The front page of the Soviet document of decision, with blue writing scrawled across the left-center of the page, authorizing the mass execution of all Polish officers who were as the war prisoners in the Soviet Union

The Poles and the Soviets re-established diplomatic relations in 1941, following the Sikorski-Mayski Agreement; but the Soviets broke them off again in 1943 after the Polish government demanded an independent examination of the recently discovered Katyn burial pits.Sanford p. 129 The Soviets then lobbied the Western Allies to recognise the pro-Soviet Polish puppet government of Wanda Wasilewska in Moscow.Sanford p. 127Dean p. 144
On 28 September 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the German–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Demarcation, changing the secret terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. They moved Lithuania into the Soviet sphere of influence and shifted the border in Poland to the east, giving Germany more territory. By this arrangement, often described as a fourth partition of Poland, the Soviet Union secured almost all Polish territory east of the line of the rivers Pisa, Narew, Western Bug and San. This amounted to about 200,000 square kilometres of land, inhabited by 13.5 million Polish citizens. The border created in this agreement roughly corresponded to the Curzon Line drawn by the British in 1919, a point that would successfully be used by Stalin during negotiations with the Allies at the Teheran Conference and Yalta Conference.Dallas p. 557 The Red Army had originally sown confusion among the locals by claiming that they were arriving to save Poland from the Nazis.Davies (1996) pp. 1001-1003 Their advance surprised Polish communities and their leaders, who had not been advised how to respond to a Soviet invasion. Polish and Jewish citizens may at first have preferred a Soviet regime to a German one.Gross pp. 24, 32-33 However, the Soviets were quick to impose their ideology on the local ways of life. For instance, the Soviets quickly began confiscating, nationalising and redistributing all private and state-owned Polish property.Piotrowski p. 11 During the two years following the annexation, the Soviets also arrested approximately 100,000 Polish citizens.
Due to lack of access to secret Soviet archives, for many years after the war the estimates of the number of Polish citizens deported to Siberia from the areas of Eastern Poland, as well as the number who perished under Soviet rule, were largely guesswork. A wide range of numbers was given in various works, between 350,000 and 1,500,000 for the number of deported to Siberia, and between 250,000 and 1,000,000 for the number who died, these numbers including mostly civilians.Rieber pp. 14, 32-37 With the opening of the Soviet secret archives after 1989, the lower range of these estimates has emerged as closer to the truth. In August 2009, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion, the authoritative Polish Institute of National Remembrance announced that its researchers reduced the estimate of the number of people deported to Siberia from one million to 320,000, and estimated that 150,000 Polish citizens perished under the Soviet rule during the war.

Belorussia and Ukraine

alt=A Sovietization propaganda poster with a man and soldier depicted removing a red and white stripped border marker. The caption text reads: "Electors of the working people! Vote for the joining of Western Ukraine with Soviet Ukraine, for a united, free and thriving Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Let's forever eliminate the border between Western and Soviet Ukraine. Long Live the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic!"

Of the 13.5 million civilians living in the newly annexed territories, Poles were the largest single ethnic group; but Belarusians and Ukrainians together made up over 50% of the population. The annexation did not give the Soviet Union control of all the areas where Belarusians or Ukrainians lived, some of which fell west of the new German–Soviet border. Nonetheless, it united the vast majority of the two peoples within the expanded Soviet Belorussian and Ukrainian republics.

On 26 October 1939, elections to Belorussian and Ukrainian assemblies were held to give the annexation an appearance of validity. The Belarusians and Ukrainians in Poland had been increasingly alienated by the Polonization policies of the Polish government and its repression of their separatist movements, so they felt little loyalty towards the Polish state.Davies (2002) pp 512–513. Not all Belarusians and Ukrainians, however, trusted the Soviet regime, which was responsible for the Ukrainian Famine of 1932–33. In practice, the poor generally welcomed the Soviets, and the elites tended to join the opposition, despite supporting the reunification itself.Nowak (online) The Soviets quickly introduced Sovietization policies in Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine, including compulsory collectivization of the whole region. In the process, they ruthlessly broke up political parties and public associations and imprisoned or executed their leaders as "enemies of the people". The Soviet authorities also suppressed the anti-Polish Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which had actively resisted the Polish regime since the 1920s; aiming for an independent, undivided Ukrainian state.Miner p. 41-42 The unifications of 1939 were nevertheless a decisive event in the history of Ukraine and Belarus, because they produced two republics which eventually achieved independence in 1991 after the fall of the Soviet Union.Wilson p. 17

Censorship

Soviet censors later suppressed many details of the 1939 invasion and its aftermath.Kubik p. 277Sanford pp. 214–216 The Politburo had from the start called the operation a "liberation campaign", and later Soviet statements and publications never wavered from that line.Rieber p. 29 On 30 November 1939, Stalin stated that it was not Germany that had attacked France and Britain, but France and Britain that had attacked Germany. The following March, Molotov claimed that Germany had tried to make peace and been turned down by "Anglo-French imperialists". Despite publication of a recovered copy of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in western media, for decades, it was the official policy of the Soviet Union to deny the existence of the protocols.Biskupski & Wandycz p. 147 The existence of the secret protocal was officially denied until 1989. Censorship was also applied in the People's Republic of Poland, to preserve the image of "Polish-Soviet friendship" promoted by the two communist governments. Official policy allowed only accounts of the 1939 campaign that portrayed it as a reunification of the Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples and a liberation of the Polish people from "oligarchic capitalism.” The authorities strongly discouraged any further study or teaching on the subject.Orlik-Rückemann p. 20Ferro p. 258 Various underground publications addressed the issue, as did other media, such as the 1982 protest song Ballada wrześniowa'' by Jacek Kaczmarski.

See also

• History of Poland (1939–1945)