The second
Gulf of Sidra incident,
January 4,
1989, occurred when two
US F-14 Tomcats shot down two
Libyan
MiG-23 Flogger Es that appeared to be attempting to engage them, as had happened previously in the first
Gulf of Sidra incident (1981).
Background
In 1973 Libya claimed much of the Gulf of Sidra as its
territorial waters and subsequently declared a "line of death", the crossing of which would invite a military response. Tensions between Libya and the U.S. were high after the U.S. accused Libya of building a
chemical weapons plant near
Rabta, causing the U.S. to deploy
USS John F. Kennedy near its coast. A second carrier group, based around
Theodore Roosevelt, was also being prepared to sail into the
Gulf of Sidra.
Engagement
On the morning of January 4, 1989, the Kennedy battle group was operating some 130 km north of Libya, with a group of
A-6 Intruders on exercise south of
Crete, escorted by two pairs of F-14As from
VF-14 and
VF-32, and as well as an
E-2C from
VAW-126. Later that morning the southernmost
Combat Air Patrol station was taken by two F-14s from VF-32, AC207 (CDR Joseph Bernard Connelly/CDR Leo F. Enwright 159610 AC207) and AC202 (LT Hermon C. Cook III/LCDR Steven Patrick Collins 159437 AC202). The officers had been specially briefed for this mission due to the high tensions regarding the Carrier Group's presence; the pilots were advised to expect some kind of hostilities.
At 11:50 hrs, after some time on patrol, the E-2 informed the F-14 crews that four Libyan MiG-23s had taken off from
Al Bumbaw airfield, near
Tobruk. The F-14s turned towards the first two MiG-23s some 50 km ahead of the rear pair and acquired them with radars. At the time the Floggers were away at 10,000 ft (3,000 m) and heading directly towards the Tomcats and carrier. The F-14s turned away from the head-on approach to indicate that they didn't want to engage. The Floggers changed course to intercept at a closing speed of about 870
knots (1,000 mph, 1600 km/h). The F-14s descended to to give them a clear radar picture of the Floggers against the sky and leave the Floggers with sea clutter to contend with. Four more times did the F-14s repeat this maneuver, still tracking the Libyans. At 11:59 the Radar Intercept Officer (RIO) of the lead Tomcat ordered the arming of the
AIM-9 Sidewinder and
AIM-7 Sparrow missiles it was carrying. The E-2C had given the F-14 crews authority to fire if threatened; the F-14 crews did not have to wait until after the Libyans opened fire.
At almost 12:01 the lead Tomcat RIO said that "Bogeys have jinked back at me again for the fifth time. They're on my nose now, inside of 20 miles", followed shortly by "Master arm on" as he ordered arming of the weapons. At a range of 14
nmi (26 km) the RIO of the lead F-14A fired the first AIM-7M Sparrow; he surprised his pilot, who did not expect to see a missile accelerate away from his Tomcat. The RIO reported "Fox 1. Fox 1." The Sparrow failed to track because of a wrong switch-setting. At 10 nmi (19 km), he launched a second Sparrow missile, but it also failed to track its target.
The Floggers accelerated and continued to approach. At 6 nmi (11 km) range the Tomcats split and the Floggers followed the wingman while the lead Tomcat circled to get a tail angle on them. The wingman engaged with a Sparrow and downed one of the Libyan aircraft. One of the US pilots broadcast "Good kill! Good kill!" The lead Tomcat closed on the final Flogger from the rear quadrant and at 1.5 nmi (2.8 km) the pilot fired a Sidewinder, which hit its target. One crewman broadcast "Good kill!" and "Let's get out of here." The Libyan pilots were seen to successfully eject and parachute into the sea, but the Libyan Air Force was unable to recover them. The Tomcats then proceeded north to return to the carrier.
Aftermath
No one is sure to why the two MiGs operated in this manner and provoked an engagement, and why the Libyans did not launch a successful rescue operation to recover the pilots. The following day, the Libyans accused the US of attacking two unarmed reconnaissance planes, but the footage, also called the gun-camera videos, showed that the Libyans had been armed with
AA-7 Apex missiles. Depending on the model, this can be either a semi-active radar-homing missile or an infrared-homing (heat-seeking) missile.
The attacks had repercussions on the NATO base at
Lampedusa, and the
U.S. Naval Air Station at Sigonella.
Gaddafi reportedly threatened reprisal against the commanders of those bases.
''Identifications of the Tomcats vary. The narrative above used the details from Air Aces
[, Air Aces.]. Another source
[.] identifies the wingman as AC202 rather than AC204. Both agree on AC207 as the lead.
F-14 Tomcat BUNO 159610
At the request of the
National Air and Space Museum, the Navy provided BUNO 159610 to its
Udvar-Hazy location near
Dulles International Airport. Although Tomcat BUNO 159610 downed the Libyan MiG-23 as a VF-32 F-14A model Tomcat, it returned from that deployment and was entered into the F-14D remanufacture program and served later in a precision strike role as a VF-31 F-14D(R). On
September 30,
2006, it was formally unveiled to the public with now retired CAPTs Connelly and Enwright on the podium as honored guests.
As of March 2008, BuNo 159437 is still resting at the Aircraft Maintenance and Restoration Group (AMARG) facility just outside Davis-Monthan AFB. The aircraft is in poor condition (lacking a windscreen and a few other panels), but has been set aside for a future museum placement that has as yet been undetermined.
See also
